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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
MELVIN SCOTT BECKSTEAD,

Case No. 20020422-CA

Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp. 2002). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996 & Supp. 2001).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Is it reasonable to infer that defendant possessed the methamphetamine found in
his urine where defendant admitted to possessing marijuana metabolite also found in his
urine, failed sobriety tests, and offered no innocent explanation for the methamphetamine
in his urine at trial?
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a bench verdict, this Court
"must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if [the Court] otherwise reaches a definite andfirmconviction that a mistake

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

has been made." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, f 10, 1999 P.2d 1252 (quotation
omitted). The conviction must be supported by "a quantum of evidence concerning each
element of the crime as charged from which the [factfinder] may base its conclusion of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt/' Id. Any legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
It is unlawfulf] for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order,
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice,
or as otherwise authorized by this subsectionf.]
UTAH CODE ANN.§

58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp. 2002).

4

Possession' or 'use' means the joint or individual ownership, control,
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application,
inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from
distribution of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group
possession or use of controlled substances. For a person to be a possessor
or user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he be shown to have
individually possessed, use, or controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if
it is shown that the person jointly participated with one or more persons in
the use, possession, or control of any substances with knowledge that the
activity was occurring, or the controlled substance is found in a place or
under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and the intent
to exercise dominion and control over it.
UTAHCODEANN. § 58-37-2(dd)(1998).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS
Charge. Defendant was charged with two third degree felonies for possession of
methamphetamine and amphetamine, and with a class B misdemeanor for possession of
marijuana (R8-9). Defendant pled guilty to the misdemeanor marijuana charge in justice
2
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court and the amphetamine charge was dismissed (R16-17), Defendant was bound over
on the felony methamphetamine charge (id.).
Bench Trial. A bench trial was held on 5 December 2001 (R41-42). The
prosecution submitted the search warrant affidavit for defendant's bodilyfluidsand
proffered that Deputy Dudley's testimony would be consistent with the affidavit
(T2:6,10) (see Exh. #1). The affidavit provided as follows:
On 1-26-01 at about 1700 hours [defendant] came to jail on a court
ordered commitment for contempt of court out of justice court.
[Defendant] was taken into the jail by me, Deputy Wes Dudley, a
jailer at the Sevier County Jail. Upon entering the jail, as I was talking with
[defendant], I could smell the odor of marijuana on or about the person of
[defendant]. I looked at the pupils in [defendant's] eyes and felt they were
dilated, which is an indication of marijuana use. I also asked [defendant] if
he had been using any dope. He said no. [Defendant] became agitated at
the question and tried to change the subject. I then contacted my sergeant,
Alan Pearson, who in turn contacted Det. Dwight Jenkins of the task force.
He asked Det. Jenkins if he could come to jail (sic) to see if [defendant] was
under the influence of a controlled substance. This is important for the
safety of [defendant] as well as other inmates and deputies who work in the
jail to determine if [defendant] is under the influence of a controlled
substance.
Det. Jenkins came to the jail at about 1800 hours to check [defendant].
[Defendant] was given a series of tests including nystagmus, one leg stand, heel to
toe and internal clock. Also checked were his pupils. [Defendant] had lack of
convergence on the nystagmus test and lack of smooth pursuit. He also failed the
one leg stand and the heel to toe. In addition, his internal clock was slow and the
pupils in his eyes were dilated. All of these are indications of use of a controlled
substance. He became very defensive when Det. Jenkins asked if he had used any
marijuana or other drugs lately. He again tried to change the subject talking about
other things and avoiding the questions about drugs.
(Exh. #1) (a copy is contained in add. A).

3
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The parties stipulated to the admission of a toxicology report indicating the
presence of marijuana metabolite and methamphetamine in defendant's urine (T2:9-10)
{see Exh. #2) (a copy is contained in add. B).
Defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant had previously pled guilty
to the possession of marijuana charge: "It (toxicology report) also shows marijuana
metabolite was in there. Well we're not contending with that. [Defendant] pled guilty to
that offense in Justice Court shortly after, ah, these events arose" (T2:7).
Having adduced the above evidence, the parties argued its sufficiency to support a
conviction of methamphetamine possession (T2:10-31). The prosecutor argued that
defendant's possession of the methamphetamine was "substantiated by the fact that he
acknowledged the voluntary use of the marijuana when he entered his plea in the Justice
Court" (T2:22). In response, defense counsel n^imized his earlier acknowledgment that
defendant pled guilty to the marijuana charge: "an admission by the defendant to
knowingly and voluntarily possessing marijuana wasn't made in this case and I suspect,
i

ah, there wasn't anything made in the Justice Court either, ah, because it's not a court of
record and it would be unusual for, ah - for a Justice of the Peace to dwell on a factual
basis for a pleaQ (see T2:27-28). The trial court took the matter under advisement
(T2:31-32).
Order. On 20 March 2002, the trial court issued an order refusing to dismiss the
methamphetamine charge and finding that defendant's possession of methamphetamine

•4
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was substantiated by his "efforts to evade questions about use of drugs" (R48-50) (a copy
is contained in add. C).
Motion to Arrest Judgment Denied. Defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment
on 23 April 2002, prior to sentencing (R69, 58-63). Defendant challenged the trial
court's ruling that his knowing and intentional possession of the methamphetamine was
buttressed by his agitation and attempts to change the subject when asked about his drug
use (R61-63). The trial court summarily denied the motion (R75) (a copy is contained in
add.E).
Sentence. The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 0-5
years in the Utah State Prison (R72-73). The trial court then suspended defendant's
prison term and placed him on 18 months probation, which included 30-days in the
county jail (id.).
Appeal. Defendant's appeal is timely (R78).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It is undisputed that a toxicology report revealed methamphetamine and marijuana
metabolite in defendant's urine. Given the additional corroborating facts that defendant
admitted to possessing marijuana injustice court and failed sobriety tests at the county
jail, it is reasonable to infer that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the
methamphetamine in his urine as well. This is particularly true in the absence of any
innocent explanation for the methamphetamine in his urine at trial.

5
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ARGUMENT
IT IS REASONABLE TO INFER THAT DEFENDANT POSSESSED
METHAMPHETAMINE FOUND IN HIS URINE WHERE
DEFENDANT ADMITTED TO POSSESSING MARIJUANA
METABOLITE ALSO FOUND IN HIS URINE, FAILED SOBRIETY
TESTS AND OFFERED NO INNOCENT EXPLANATION FOR THE
METHAMPHETAMINE IN HIS URINE AT TRIAL
Defendant asserts that the toxicology report revealing the presence of
methamphetamine and marijuana metabolite in his urine is insufficient to support his
conviction for possession of methamphetamine. Aplt Br. at 5-10. Defendant cites the
majority rule that, absent some corroborating proof of knowledge and intent, a positive
drug test alone does not prove a defendant's knowing and intentional possession of drugs
revealed in bodily fluids. Aplt Br. at 5 (citing cases). Here, defendant's obvious
impairment at the county jail, his admission to possessing the marijuana metabolite
constitutes corroborating proof that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the
methamphetamine as well. Defendant's insufficiency claim thus fails.
Elements of Methamphetamine Possession.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 58-37-8 (1998

& Supp. 2001), proscribes any knowing and intentional possession or use of controlled
substances, unless the substance was obtained 'Hinder a valid prescription or order,
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice^]"
"'Possession' or 'use' means the . . . control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging,
maintaining, or the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption . . . of
controlled substances." UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-2(dd) (1998).

6
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Proceedings Below. In lieu of testimonial evidence, the parties stipulated to the
admission of a toxicology report revealing the presence of marijuana metabolite and
methamphetamine in defendant's urine (T2:5-7) (see Exh. # 2), add. B. Additionally, the
parties stipulated that Deputy Dudley's testimony, if called, would be consistent with the
search warrant affidavit for defendant's bodily fluids (id.) (See Exh. # 1), add. A.
According to the affidavit, defendant reported to the Sevier County Jail to serve an
unrelated term smelling of marijuana and exhibiting other characteristics of drug
impairment (Exh. # 1), Add. A. Defendant failed field sobriety tests and tried to change
the subject when officers asked whether he was using marijuana or any other drug (id.).
Although he later attempted to minimize its significance, defense counsel
acknowledged that defendant pled guilty in justice court to possessing marijuana
and therefore was "not contending with that" (T2:7,27). A guilty plea to possessing
marijuana necessarily constituted an admission that he knowingly and intentionally
possessed that drug. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp. 2002). See
also State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266,1273 (Utah 1988) (recognizing that 4"a guilty plea
is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge'" (quoting McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459,466 (1969)).
The trial court determined defendant was guilty of methamphetamine possession
on the grounds that "finding both methamphetamine and marijuana metabolite in the
Defendant's system, coupled with the Defendant's efforts to evade questions about use of
drugs, [was] sufficient to conclude that the use was voluntary"(R50).
7 :'
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The Majority Rule. The majority of jurisdictions to consider this issue have
concluded that a positive drug test alone does not prove a defendant's knowing and
intentional possession of a controlled substance in bodily fluid. See, e.g., State v. McCoy,
864 P.2d 307, 311 (N.M. App. 1993), reversed on other grounds, 882 P.2d 1 (N.M.
1994); State v. Benton, 884 P.2d 505, 505 (N.M. App. 1994); City of Logan v. Cox, 624
N.E.2d 751, 754 (Ohio App. 1993); Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 608 N.E.2d 717, 721
n.7(Mass. 1993). Those jurisdictions reason that once a controlled substance enters the
body, the ability to exercise dominion and control over its consequent effect is lost. Id.
Utah's appellate courts have not directly confronted this issue, although this Court cited
the majority rule with approval in State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466,467 n.2 (Utah App.
1988).
While the bench verdict here focuses primarily on the toxicology report indicating
the presence of marijuana metabolite and methamphetamine in defendant's urine, the
prosecution presented "some corroborating evidence" that defendant's possession of both
the drugs in his urine was knowing and intentional. McCoy, 864 P.2d at 312. First,
defendant failed field sobriety tests administered at the county jail (Exh. # 1), add. A.
Second, defendant admitted to possessing marijuana injustice court (T2:7). See State v.
Hall, 409 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. App. 1991) (upholding methamphetamine possession
conviction based on blood test result because there was additional evidence to support the
charge including accident scene, high level of alcohol also present in defendant's system,

l
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and defendant's behavior and demeanor), reversed on other grounds, Curtis v. State, 2002
WL 31298857,

S.E.2d

(Ga.2002).1

Given the above, and absent any innocent explanation for the toxicology results at
trial, it is reasonable to infer that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the
methamphetamine discovered along with the marijuana metabolite in his urine {see Exh. #
2), add. B. Ordinarily, one does not "accidentally" get meth in bodily fluids. Rather, the
more likely and reasonable explanation is that it was purposefully ingested. That
reasonable inference is supported, in this case, by the fact that defendant admitted that he
intentionally ingested another illegal substance, marijuana. That admission shows a
willingness to use illegal substances, thereby suggesting that the meth was not "slipped"

l

The trial court also relied on defendant's agitation and avoidance of questioning
about his suspected drug use at the county jail (R50), add. C. On appeal, defendant
contends that this evidence constitutes inadmissible post-arrest silence. Aplt. Br. at 13.
The record does not support defendant's conclusory suggestion that he was arrested for
the marijuana charge prior to this questioning {see Exh. A). Nor is it clear that defendant
was otherwise in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
before police asked about his apparent recent drug use—defendant's cursory brief does
not analyze this issue. Aplt. Br. at 13-14. While the record sheds little light on the
"language used to summon" defendant to the county jail, or on the "physical surroundings
of the interrogation," and whether "additional pressure was exerted to detain" defendant,
it does appear defendant was confronted with evidence of his guilt. See, e.g., State v.
Swink, 2000 UT App 262, f 11,11 P.3d 299 (setting forth relevant considerations for
evaluating applicability of Miranda warnings to an inmate). While not conceding
custody, the State recognizes that the question is a close one and for that reason does not
rely heavily on defendant's response to the drug related questioning to support its
sufficiency claim here. See Swink, 2000 UT App 262, ^ f 11-13 (holding that Swink's
intake interview did not amount to custodial interrogation where Swink was interviewed
by a youth counselor as opposed to a police officer and was not confronted with evidence
of his culpability in the vehicle theft, which theft authorities were unaware of until Swink
himself revealed it during the interview).
9
-
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to defendant, but was voluntarily ingested. Thus, absent some innocent explanation the
trial court reasonably inferred from the presence of methamphetamine in defendant's
urine, that he intentionally and knowingly possessed and used that substance.
As noted by the trial court, a similar inference is permitted in receiving stolen
property cases. Indeed, this Court upheld a jury instruction providing that "[possession
of property recently stolen, if not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance
from which you may reasonably draw the inference andfind,in light of the surrounding
circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that the person in possession of the
stolen property stole the property and knew that it was stolen." State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1,
5 (Utah App. 1996) (emphasis in original), cert, denied, 934 P.2d 652 (Utah 1997). See
also State v. Williams, 111 P.2d 220 (1985) (upholding forgery conviction where
"[defendant presented no evidence to controvert the logical inferences which could be

{

drawn by the jury, i.e., that without any explanation as to where he got the check or from
whom, the defendant knew the check was forged"); State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,
988 P.2d 949 ("Under current Utah law, a person who merely utters a forged instrument
can be inferred to have had knowledge of the forgery") (citing Williams, 111 P.2d at 223).
Such an inference is arguably more compelling in a drug possession case than in a
receiving stolen property case, because methamphetamine is an inherently illicit
substance that ordinarily is ingested voluntarily. In other words, unlike controlled
substances found in one's system, there is nothing about the physical characteristics of a

10

\-
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television set or other property that would necessarily suggest to the possessor that it was
stolen.
Moreover, given the compelling nature of the toxicology report and the
corroborating facts that defendantflunkedsobriety tests at the jail and admitted to
possessing the marijuana metabolite in his urine, there is at least as much evidence of
possession here as in Provo City v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437,443 (Utah App. 1993). This
Court affirmed Sport's conviction for marijuana possession in the absence of my
"chemical test data," noting that under such a circumstance, evidence of the substance's
smell, together with observations of Spotts taking "hits"froma "joint," his physical
characteristics of impairment, and his inculpatory statements "approachefd] the outer
limit of what [the Court] would affirm for a possession case." Id
Jurisdiction. The above evidence not only establishes beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant possessed the methamphetamine in his urine, but also the trial court's
jurisdictionalfinding(R46). As recognized in Sorenson, the non-element of jurisdiction
need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, 758 P.2d at 470.
While the prosecutor conceded that it is not known where defendant ingested the
methamphetamine (T2:30), such evidence is not critical to the State's possession theory.
As set forth above, evidence of controlled or illicit substances in one's bodilyfluidsis
evidence of possession, which in this case is buttressed by defendant's admission that he
intentionally possessed the marijuana metabolite found alongside the meth in his urine.
See, e.g., Section 58-37-2(dd) ("'Possession' or 'use' means the . . . control, occupancy,
11
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holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, inhalation, swallowing,
injection, or consumption . . . of controlled substances."). Accordingly, more important
than the locale of ingestion is evidence that defendant exhibited signs of impairment in
the county jail and admitted to possessing the marijuana metabolite injustice court
(T2:7). It is reasonable to inferfromthese facts that, just as he possessed the marijuana
metabolite in his urine in Sevier County, defendant possessed the methamphetamine
found alongside the marijuana metabolite in his urine in Sevier County.
The State's possession theory in this case is distinguishable from the result in
Sorenson, where the State proceeded on a consumption theory under a different statute
prohibiting alcohol possession by a minor. 758 P.2d at 467. Because the State failed to
put on evidence that Sorenson consumed the alcohol within Utah, there was insufficient
evidence to establish jurisdiction. Id. at 470. Here, on the other hand, in retaining the
meth in his urine in Sevier County, defendant committed the offense of possession "either
wholly or partly within the state" and that is sufficient to establish jurisdiction. See UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 76-1-201 (l)-(2) (1999) ("A person is subject to jurisdiction in this state" if

"the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the state[.]... An offense is
committed partly within this state if either the conduct which is any element of the

i

offense, or the result which is such an element, occurs within this state itself").

I
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CONCLUSION
Based on the above, defendant's conviction for possession of methamphetamine
should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on ^December 2002.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

IAN DE(
'Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on 3_ December 2002,1 mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee, postage prepaid, to the following:
MARCUS TAYLOR
175 North Main Street
P.O. Box 728
Richfield, Utah 84701
Attorney for Appellee
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SEVIER COUNTY JAIL

AFFIDAVIT- GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A BODY
FLUIDS SEARCH WARRANT
ON 1-26-01 AT ABOUT 1700 HOURS MELVIN SCOTT BECKSTEAD CAME TO
JAIL ON A COURT ORDERED COMMITMENT FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT OUT OF
JUSTICE COURT.
MR. BECKSTEAD WAS TAKEN INTO THE JAIL BY ME, DEPUTY WES
DUDLEY, A JAILER AT THE SEVIER COUNTY JAIL. UPON ENTERING THE
JAIL, AS I WAS TALKING WITH MR. BECKSTEAD, I COULD SMELL THE ODOR
OF MARIJUANA ON OR ABOUT THE PERSON OF MBLVIN SCOTT BECKSTEAD. I
LOOKED AT THE PUPILS IN MR. BBCKSTEADS EYES AND FELT THEY WERE
DIALATED, WHICH IS AN INDICATION OF MARIJUANA USB. I ALSO ASKED
MR. BECKSTEAD IF HE HAD BEEN USING ANY DOPE. HE SAID NO. MR.
BECKSTEAD BECAME AGGITATED AT THE QUESTION AND TRIED TO CHANGE THE
SUBJECT. I THEN CONTACTED MY SERGEANT, ALAN PEARSON WHO IN TURN
CONTACTED DET. DWIGHT JENKINS OF THE TASK FORCE. HE ASKED DET.
JENKINS IF HE COULD COMB TO JAIL TO SEB IF MR. BECKSTEAD WAS UNDER
THE INFLUENCE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. THIS IS IMPORTANT FOR THE
SAFETY OF INMATE MELVIN BECKSTEAD AS WELL AS OTHER INMATES AND
DEPUTIES WHO WORK IN THB JAIL TO DBTBRMINB IF MR. BECKSTEAD IS
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
DET. JENKINS CAME TO THB JAIL AT ABOUT 1800 HOURS TO CHECK
MELVIN SCOTT BECKSTEAD. MR. BECKSTEAD WAS GIVEN A SERIES OF TESTS
INCLUDING NYSTAGMAS, ONE LEG STAND, HEEL TO TOB AND INTERNAL CLOCK.
ALSO CHECKED WERB HIS PUPILS.
MR. BECKSTEAD HAD LACK OF
CONVERGENCE ON THE NYSTAGMUS TEST AND LACK OF SMOOTH PURSUIT. HE
ALSO FAILED THE ONB LEO STAND AND THE HEEL TO TOB. IN ADDITION HIS
INTERNAL CLOCK WAS SLOW AND THB PUPILS IN HIS EYES WERE DIALATED.
ALL OF THESE ARE INDICATIONS OF USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
HE BECAME VERY DEFENSIVE WHBN DET. JENKINS ASKED IF HE HAD USED ANY
MARIJUANA OR OTHER DRUGS LATELY. HE AGAIN TRIED TO CHANGE THE
SUBJECT TALKING ABOUT OTHER THINGS AND. AVOIDING THB QUESTIONS ABOUT
DRUGS.
FOR THE SAFETY OF ALL CONCERNED WE PRAY A SEARCH WARRANT BE
ISSUED FOR BODY FLUIDS FROM MBLVIN SCOTT BECKSTEAD.
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IN THE ifr*W«irit.4- COURT
COUNTY OP <^Atr , STATE OP UTAH
STATE OP UTAH

)
33

COUNTY OP <*u\*s

)
SEARCH WARRANT

To any Peace Officer in the State of Utah:
Proof by affidavit under oath having bein made ^hie day
before me by L^U^ JV-IU^V
* I *<* eatiefied that there is
,
probable cauae to believe that on the pereon of flL*iu\* *,*& 9**.c)iVie°a
presently located at
4c<s\mr f ^ A ^ .W%\
County of <±ui*r . State of Utah, there are controlled substances
which are contained in hie/her body fluids, which were unlawfully
acquired or are unlawfully possessed.
YOU ARB THEREFORE COMMANDED: in the day or night time to
obtain a body fluid sample from t&f\u\* 5fo«ft <&*&**W*l
.
Given under my hand and

wvuiiwj wi. . Ttuierr
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALi H
DIVISION OF EPIDEMIOLOGY & LABORATORY SERVICES
PUBLIC SAFETY TOXICOLOGY SECTION

Gev«m«c

4* NORTH MEDICAL DRIVE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84U3-U0S

(*H)St4-*400
(Wl)5*4-*50!-Fn

TOXICOLOGY REPORT

AGENCY: SEVIER COUNTY SHERIPP

LABORATORY NO:

L2001-043S

SUSPECT: BBCKSTBAD, MBLVIN SCOTT
09/27/1982
UT162997581

AGENCY CASE NO:

1001181

OFFICER:

WESLEY DUDLEY

LABORATORY FINDINGS

Amphetamine and methamphetamine were confirmed positive in the urine by GC/MS.
Urine marijuana metabolite was confirmed positive by GC/MS at a level above
75 nanograms per milliliter.

jUx»A.

Analysed by Susan A. Raemusaen
URINB COCADH:

\\^(<XKw\Knjw~

Hone Detected

Sworn and subscribed to before me this

14

day of

March

2001

fTATrsEXHterr
Notary Public Signature
^
( | Report I
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A r l H ^ n H u m C*

CLERK

R. Don Brown #0464
Sevier County Attorney
Sevier County Justice Complex
835 East 300 North, Suite 100
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone: (435) 896-2675

Qa

IN THB DISTRICT COURT OP THB SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.

:

MELVIN SCOTT BBCXSTKAD,
DOB: 09/27/82
Defendant.

:
Case No. 011600086FS
Judge David L. Mower

The Court, having considered the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss in conjunctioa with the taking of testimony at a bench trial
on the 5th day of December, 2001, and having taken the matter under
advisement and being fully advised, now enters the following:

rapawi or FACT
1. On January 26, 2001, the Defendant, pursuant to a
commitment issued by the Sevier County Justice Court, reported to the
Sevier County Jail to commence service of a jail sentence.
2.

That the intake officer, Deputy Wesley Dudley, could

smell the odor of burnt marijuana on the Defendant's person and made
observations with regard to the Defendant's eyes which indicated
possible impairment from the use of marijuana.
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3.

Deputy Dudley inquired as to whether the Defendant had

been using marijuana.
4.

The Defendant became agitated, tried to change the

subject and did not answer.
5.

Deputy Dudley requested the assistance of Deputy Dwight

Jenkins, an officer with substantial experience in evaluating persons
under the influence of controlled substances.
6.

Deputy Jenkins evaluated the Defendant, determined that

he exhibited signs of impairment and inquired as to whether he had
recently used marijuana or other controlled substances.
7.

The Defendant avoided answering the question about drug

use*
8. A body fluid search warrant was obtained and a sample
taken from the Defendant.
9.

Laboratory analysis of the sample revealed the presence

of methamphetamine and marijuana metabolite in the Defendant's system.
Having entered the above findings of fact, the Court
concludes as follows:

CCTqiMIQffg S L I M
1. The use of narcotics is prohibited by Section 58-37-8,
Utah Code Annotated.
2.

"Use" is defined in Section 58-37-2, Utah Code Annotated

at subparagraph (l)(dd), and includes where "the controlled substance
is found in a place or under circumstances indicating that the person
had the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over it."
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3.

The finding of both methamphetamine and marijuana

metabolite in the Defendant's system, coupled with the Defendant's
efforts to evade questions about use of drugs, is sufficient to
conclude that the use was voluntary.

The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied.

DATED this

;i

day of March, 2002.

D*VfD L. MOWER
0X7ID
DISTRICT COURT

MMMMfl CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy~of the
above and foregoing a u i a m ORDBR was placed in the United states
mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class.-postage thereon fully
prepaid on the

day of March, 2002, addressed as follows:
Mr. Marcus Taylor
Attorney at Law
173 North Main Street
». a. lex 782
Richfield, Utah 84701

l\m*w. vX^. vN- uOai

MAILINC CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing SIQM1D ORDER was placed in the United States mail
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at Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid on
the

It

da

Y of March, 2002, addressed as follows:
Mr. Marcus Taylor
Attorney at Law
175 North Main Street
P. 0. Box 728
Richfield, Utah 87401
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